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I n his essay "Situation and Suspicion in the Thought of Merleau-Ponty: The Question of Phenomenology and Poli­tics," Merold Westphal argues that Merleau-Ponty's philoso­phy of ambiguity necessitates political complacency: 
"Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, which in both 
its early and later forms is a powerful synthesis of method and 
ontology, has a minimal significance for his political writings" 
(160). According to this argument, Merleau-Ponty is unable to 
deduce a critical politics from his phenomenology of perception, 
because the latter is a philosophy of ambiguity. For Merleau­
Ponty, the structure of perception requires inexhaustible hori­
zons of meaning. Due to the situated-ness of perception within 
these horizons, ambiguity is required at the expense of absolute 
meaning.1 Yet counter to Westphal, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy 
of ambiguity not only rejects political complacency but also 
justifies critical philosophy. 
Through his rejection of epistemological foundationaHsffi, 
Merleau-Ponty can achieve a politics that minimizes the terror­
ism implicit in dogmatic political philosophy. When politics is 
dominated by a vanguard group's monopoly on abstract Truth, 
at the expense of the masses' lived experience, the progressive 
politics of revolution become reactive terrorism. Vanguard poli­
tics occurs with both liberalism's call for pure principled rational­
ity and also Hegelian-Marxist dialectics that posit reason in 
history. Only when political activity returns to the concrete level 
of existence can grounds be opened for the critical politics of 
revolution. Thus the philosophy of ambiguity not only provides 
a powerful critique of the terrorism implicit in foundationalism, 
it also creates new possibilities for revolutionary modality. 
Westphal locates the disjunction between Merleau­
Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity and political theory around the 
latter's hermeneutics of suspicion. In the spirit of Marx, Niet­
zsche, and Freud, a hermeneutics of suspicion aims to uncover, 
unmask, or demystify the 'forgetfulness' of self-deception. Yet 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity fails to demystify the 
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horizons as is required for a hermeneutics of suspicion. Westphal 
asks: "Is the philosophy of ambiguity, in either its earlier or later 
version, a.critical philosophy in any meaningful sense?" (167). He 
answers: "only minimally." According to Westphal, a philosophy 
of ambiguity fails to show why dogmatism is a viable part of 
political life. In de constructing the foundational tradition of abso­
lute meaning, Merleau-Ponty loses the grounds needed for cri­
tique. All meaning is within the shifting horizons of Being. 
The situational character of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy 
of ambiguity necessitates the existence of latent horizons of 
meaning. Yet any hermeneutics of suspicion requires that the 
repressed latency be made available given proper analysis. For 
Freud, psychoanalysis can uncover the repressed unconscious. 
Similarly for Marx, the proletariat gains class-consciousness of 
their once-latent condition. In contrast, for Merleau-Ponty's phe­
nomenology, we never overcome the ambiguity of situatedness. 
The latent horizons of experience are the invisible, which make 
the visible possible, and yet are always on the fleeting corners of 
our experience. 
By characterizing Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambigu­
ity as complacency, Westphal misinterprets the very essence of 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. Instead of seeking a 
hermeneutics of suspicion to justify his critical politics, Merleau­
Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity is necessary for a critical poli­
tics. By grounding his politics in a hermeneutics of suspicion, as 
Westphal requires, Merleau-Ponty would negate the ambiguity 
required for critical politics. Westphal has failed to acknowledge 
the dynamic nature of the horizons of Being, and thus the critical 
element therein. 
This connection between a philosophy of ambiguity and a 
critical politics is contained in Phenomenology of Perception, and is 
only intensified in later works.2 Merleau-Ponty's early political 
writings must be interpreted as a continuation of this common 
theme, and not a hermeneutics of suspicion lacking proper philo­
sophical grounding. This is especially important in reading Hu­
manism and Terror, which seems most likely to flirt with the 
absolute role of the proletariat. Concerning Merleau-Ponty's phi­
losophy of ambiguity, Westphal states "the philosophy that 
moves from being-in-the-world to Being as its ground (and 
abyss), first in Heidegger and then in Merleau-Ponty, is estheti­
cally but not politically fruitful" (178). This last clause, contrast­
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ing politics with aesthetics, tips us off in the right direction. 
I will demonstrate first that Merleau-Ponty's critique of 
political dogmatism stems from his larger rejection of epistemo­
logical foundationalism (I). Secondly, I will argue that through 
such a critique, Merleau-Ponty makes possible radical politics of 
revolution, not complacency (II). By redefining political engage­
ment in terms of philosophy of ambiguity (I), Merleau-Ponty 
creates new possibilities for revolutionary modality (II). Only 
when his political theory is understood in conjunction with his 
philosophy of ambiguity are radical politics possible. 
I. 
An understanding of the critical nature of Merleau-Ponty's phi­
losophy of ambiguity requires a preliminary sketch of his rejec­
tion of epistemological foundationalism, and its political counter­
part of dogmatism. Westphal had argued that the most Merleau­
Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity could achieve was a critique of 
political dogmatism, and yet could not even show why such 
dogmatism was a viable part of political life.3 To the conrrary, 
Merleau-Ponty's critique of dogmatism not only shows that it 
gains a viable role through its connection with epistemological 
foundationalism, but also that such a critique is a necessary 
prerequisite for a critical politics of revolution. This latter claim is 
h'ue because MerIeau-Ponty's critique breaks the status quo ter­
rorism of vanguard party politics (based on foundational episte­
mology) and reopens the horizons for the dialectic to solicit 
revolutionary activity. 
For Merleau-Ponty, political action, like perception, is 
situated and thus does not lend itself to absolute judgments. In 
his philosophy of ambiguity, Merleau-Ponty seeks to reject such 
foundationalism's attempt to rranscend the situated character of 
socio-natural eksistance, and make absolute judgments. The goal 
of foundationalism's transcendence is to gain access to the pure 
eidos of reality, because only therein apodicticity can be achieved. 
Yet in such a process, concrete lived experience is negated in 
favor of rational reflection. Situation is forgotten, and absrract 
forms are posited as 'absolute.' In Phenomenologtj of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty rejects a long rradition of epistemological found a­
tionalism, which seeks to subordinate lived-experience to ratio­
nal reflection. Husserl sought to perform an epochi to bracket 
lived-experience. The act of bracketing through rational reflec­
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tion is to recover the essential structure of experience. HusserI's 
apodicticity requires forfeiting the body, other selves, and the 
world of lived-experience. In his Cartesian Meditations, HusserI 
describes his method as uncovering" an all-embracing essentially 
necessary structural form belonging to all transcendental subjec­
tivity" (57). It is exactly this h'anscendental phenomenology, 
which Merleau-Ponty rejects in Phenomenology ofPerception. 
Political dogmatism is a natural outgrowth of foundation­
alism because relativity threatens to contaminate the pure eidos. 
In Phenonzenol0gtj of Perception Merleau-Ponty states "with cogito 
begins that sh'uggle between consciousnesses each of which, as 
Hegel says, seeks the death of the otller" (355). Stalin's view of a 
vanguard party functions using the same foundationalist 
paradigm as Kant, Heget and HusserI. Existential modality is 
insufficient to bind individuals together. The only 'true' COlmec­
tion is reflective and thus exclusive. Rational consciousnesses of 
the privileged few (a vanguard/master) impose abstract truths 
upon the concrete experiences of the masses, disguising the 
situational nature of the former. Such an act is terrorism. 
Terrorism can be defined as the introduction of absolute 
forms into the content of inter-subjective lived-experience. Ter­
rorism arises when the experiences of the masses are subjugated 
to the absolute forms dictated by a vanguard party. One example 
is writing history from a white male perspective, and characteriz­
ing it as "natural" history. Such is an act of terrorism against 
females and non-whites, whose history is considered secondary 
and accessory. Such "natural" history terrorizes the lived­
experience of the subordinate group. 
In Sense and Nonsense Merleau-Ponty writes, lithe man 
with the most exact awareness of the human situation is not the 
master (since the master pretends ignorance of the foundations of 
being and communication underlying the play of his despair and 
pride) but the slave" (68). The master imposes a situational 
perspective as absolute, rendering the lived-experience of the 
slave irrational. Yet the slave is more firmly rooted in the world, 
and possesses greater awareness of the horizons. The slave pos­
sesses the "double consciousness" of DuBois, allowing for an 
understanding of the interdependency of both the master and 
slave. The slave understands his or her role both from the "slave" 
perspective, and also from the perspective of the master. As the 
master imposes his or her forms as absolute, in a corresponding 
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act the forgotten horizons become charged. A tension grows as 
the master moves further away from the horizons. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, problems arise when the 
dictatorship of the proletariat becomes a vanguar d-for-its elf. In 
Humanism and Terror he states "the dictatorship of the proletariat 
is not the will of a few officials who are the only ones initiated 
into the secret of history, as in Hegel; it follows the spontaneous 
movement of the proletariat in every country and relies upon the 
instinct of the masses" (xix). Counter to Westphal's claims, dog­
matism is a viable part of political life because it is an outgrowth 
of epistemological foundationalism. A vanguard party in posses­
sion of the logic of history will inevitably subject the life of the 
masses to its will. Only through foundational legitimization can 
such an act of terrorism be justified. 
The critique of foundationalism, both epistemological and 
political, is the cornerstone of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of 
ambiguity. The phenomenon of foundationallsm is not as myste­
rious as Westphal suggests. He requires that the self-deception of 
foundationalism stem from a retrievable unconscious or a Will to 
Power. However, foundationalism is simply an attempt to trans­
form situated perspective into absolute law. By such a transfor­
mation, a group can feel justified in political action due to apodic­
ticity. Such an act is reactive in nature because it seeks to mold an 
atemporal logic to history and is unable to account for the di­
verse, the ambiguous, and the "irrationaL" 
Political dogmatism leads to reactive politics and alien­
ates the concrete experiences of the masses. By revealing the 
situated nature of foundational epistemology, Merleau-Ponty 
breaks the status quo terrorism of the vanguard party and re­
opens the horizons of change. Because I am situated, and thus 
incomplete, I can have being-for-others. The moment I posit 
myself as essential, as cogito, or as a monad, I am cut off from 
others, from my world, and from my body. Only in the absence 
of apodicticihj is reciprocity possible. My situation is within the 
hermeneutics of Being, and thus foundationalism is an impossi­
ble venture. Merleau-Ponty states "universality is only con­
ceived, it is not lived" (H. T., 116). The only means to minimize 
terror is to embrace the horizons of situated-ness, and keep the 
dialogue open. The vanguard cannot empathize with the prole­
tariat's experience because it seeks to dominate it. The vanguard 
seeks divinity but in the process forgets its humanity. Thus we 
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must not conceive of Merleau-Ponty's politics as separate from 
his phenomenology, as both share a common ambiguity. His 
political theory furthers the attack on foundationalism, because 
application of foundational principles to politics leads to conser­
vatism. Only upon return to the ambiguity of the concrete can a 
radical politics of revolution form without the conservative ter­
rorism of vanguard foundationalism. 
II. 
Westphal had argued that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambi­
guity justifies situation instead of denouncing it, and thus cannot 
maintain a critical politics. To the contrary, the absence of ambi­
guity, sought by foundationalism, denies critical politics in favor 
of dogmatism. However, philosophy of ambiguity goes beyond 
mere critique by offering a critical politics of revolution. 
By rejecting the inherent terrorism of foundationalism, 
Merleau-Ponty reopens the ground for critical activity. Being, not 
logic, compels us to adopt revolution, and ambiguity saves it 
from terrorism. Only through solicitation from situation, from 
flesh, and from Being, can the individual gain the critical per­
spective necessary for revolulionary modality. As will be demon­
sh'ated, Westphal's statement that Merleau-Ponty' s philosophy 
of ambiguity is /Iesthelically but not politically fruitful" contains 
the deepest element of truth. Only when politics has been rede­
fined aesthetically, can we overcome the terrorism of foundation­
alism and achieve a critical politics of revolution. 
In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty states, 
"what I understand never quite tallies with my living experience, 
in short I am never quite at one with myself" (347). The horizons, 
which Westphal calls 'self-deception,' shape meaning. The invisi­
ble allows us to see the visible. We do not see the invisible, but 
see because of it. Counter to Westphal's claim, the positing of 
non-the tic horizons is not an act of bad faith, but a necessary part 
of experience. Merleau-Ponty's rejection of foundationalism's I = 
I redefines the I as being-in-the-world. As a being-in-the-world, I 
encounter a world molded by humanity and a world containing 
traces of IIother selves." By placing the first inter-subjective con­
tact in the perceptual world of lived-experience, Merleau-Ponty 
avoids foundationalism's exclusionist tactics of positing others 
on a transcendental level. All meaning is given within the world, 
and abstract principles of the Kantian-Husserlian sort are contin­
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gent and immanently plagued by lived-experience. MerIeau­
Ponty states "between my consciousness and my body as I 
experience it, between this phenomenal body of mine and that of 
another as I see it from the outside, there exists an internal 
relation which causes the other to appear as the completion of the 
system" (PhP, 352). Other selves are a pre-given part of my 
lived-experience, and not the bracketed objects of reflection in 
HusserI's transcendentalism. Thus, such a phenomenology of 
perception does not encounter the problems plaguing founda­
tional inter-subjectivity and its inherent terrorism of exclusion. 
Meaning is based on the primacy of perception, as 
Merleau-Ponty states lithe social is already there when we come 
to know it and judge it" (PhP, 362). As in Gestalt psychology, the 
forms are not absolute but derived from the horizons. Meaning 
can be stabilized but never formalized. Applying Merleau­
Ponty's phenomenology of perception to politics, the forms of 
political activity (the abstract principles) are inseparable from the 
matter of political activity (the concrete lived-experiences). As 
Merleau-Ponty states, the matter is pregnant with form. Yet the 
vanguard (the form) is inseparable from the proletariat's embod­
ied experience in the world (matter). The proletariat's experience 
has its own meaning (form), although such is deemed insufficient 
in the vanguard's quest for the eidos. 
Like perceptual meaning, political meaning forms within 
our experience. In Sense and Nonsense, MerIeau-Ponty states "all 
several men need to do is live together and be associated with the 
same task for some rudimentary rules and a beginning of law to 
emerge from their life in common" (118). Meaning takes place 
within experience, and not on some transcendental level outside 
of experience. We encounter forms within lived-experience, yet 
not the absolute forms sought after by the epochi. The above 
passage illustrates the connection between Merleau-Ponty's phi­
losophy of ambiguity and his critical politics. Within the horizons 
of ambiguity political meaning is inescapable, even if it is not the 
apodicticity of dogmatic foundationalism. 
For both the perceptual and the political, meaning is 
derived from the ambiguity of situation. Sense is derived from 
Nonsense, as is the Visible from the Invisible. Meaning is given in 
a world surrounded by horizons, as Merleau-Ponty states in 
Humanism and Terror, IIone does not become a revolutionary 
through science, but out of indignation" (11). Yet how can we 
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undertake a critical politics if all action relies on situation, and 
situated perspective is contingent? Does this ambiguity not con­
demn us to inactivity due to limited perspective? 
Due to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity, inter­
subjectivity is derived from situated being-in-the-world and not 
transcendental Egology. The problem with the latter's inter­
subjectivity is its a priori definition of legitimate subjectivity, and 
thereby its exclusion of 'irrational' subjects. Vanguard leadership 
is derived from such exclusionist inter-subjectivity. Merleau­
Ponty's dismissal of vanguard leadership, due to his rejection of 
foundationalism, makes true responsibility possible. Also, revo­
lutionary modality is no longer an act of transcendental will, but 
a process that requires other selves and Being. And therein 
critical politics of revolution is possible. The mistaken dilemma is 
that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity leads to either 
political complacency or the amoralism of Nietzsche's unprinci­
pled Clbermensch. Yet, just because history has not been won in 
Heaven or in a primordial battle of the gods, this need not 
condemn us to the dilemma between amoralism and compla­
cency. 
The revolution gives no 'pure' motives, our conunitment 
is never absolute. It is always an activity counter-balanced by 
doubts, by fears, and by uninviting material conditions. In effect, 
the workers have more to lose than their chains. In Pllenomenologtj 
ofPerception, Merleau-Ponty states lIalthough I can will myself to 
adopt a course of conduct and act the part of a warrior or a 
seducer, it is not within my power to be a warrior or a seducer 
with ease and in a way that 'comes naturally'i really to be one 
that is" (436). My project is more than my will alone; it requires 
my situation. Without an inviting situation, we become Don 
Quixote willing himself a Knight in a world without chivalry. 
Thus I am not Sartre's monad of freedom; I am bound by my 
past, by the present, and by others around me in my world. 
Freedom is freedom-in-a-situation, and thus it is difficult 
to become a revolutionary in a time of peace and prosperity. 
Concerning the arrival of meaning within experience, Merleau­
Ponty states lias Gestalt psychology has shown, there are for me 
certain shapes which are particularly favorable, as they are for 
other men... " (PhP, 440). Like perceptual gestalts, the revolution­
ary shape forms for the oppressed. It is "natural" for them to 
"see" revolution as viable activity; their horizons of Being present 
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a revolution to-be-achieved. 
To state 'the oppressed masses will eventually revolt' 
means neither pure reflective will nor mechanical necessity. To 
prove that revolution should be undertaken is not like proving a 
mathematical equation. I-the-oppressed exist in a situation that 
"naturally" lends itself to revolutionary consciousness. What I 
make of such natural inclinations is up to me, yet they are 
there-to-be-intended. Even if I deny them, I still take up a posi­
tion in response to them; in this case, that of denial. Through 
external persuasion I can learn to see the gestalt shapes differ­
ently, but never as pure free will. Even this process of learning 
requires my pre-existing situation. 
The revolution is not something to be entered into lightly, 
because my horizons must be inviting. Far from Westphal's 
notion of static horizons of ambiguity, the horizons are the 
necessary source of revolutionary persuasion. As the master 
forgets the horizons in favor of abstract eidos, the neglected 
horizons become charged. The slave cannot forget his or her 
material existence, as can the master. Despite the ambiguous 
horizons of the slave's experience, the slave remembers situation. 
And as the master moves further away from situation, the slave's 
horizons become ever more charged with forms of revolution. 
Only through tlle horizons of Being can revolutionary 
modality be made possible. My status as a revolutionary requires 
reciprocity by my fellow revolutionaries and my world. Much 
like Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, who requires an invitation 
from God, my situation and my fellow persons must elect me as 
a revolutionary. I must be able to "play their language game" 
through a common reservoir of lived experience and a common 
situation. I must have the ability to view the world as "naturally" 
ripe-for-revolution. Being solicits me to become part of the revo­
lution, serving as the background for my activity. In effect, I must 
believe in the revolution. 
Westphal's problem with the ambiguity of situated-ness 
has not been resolved because no source of judgment has been 
established. However, it is absolutely essential that such ambigu­
ity persists, and that the epochi is rendered impossible. Without 
ambiguity, dogmatic terrorism is inevitable. Only when the con­
crete experience of the non-vanguard element is embraced with 
its ambiguity can terrorism be minimized. Unlike the vanguard, 
embodiment always contains traces of doubt, fear, and uncer­
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tainty, and such are necessary to avoid terrorism. True responsi­
bility requires an openness to change, to ambiguity, and to 
pluralism. In Humanism and Terror, Merleau-Ponty states "the 
point is that we are not spectators of a closed history; we are 
actors in an open history, our praxis introduces the element of 
construction rather than knowledge as an ingredient in the 
world" (92). Only when an embodied revolutionary group acts 
without presumptuous notions of foundational apodicticitlj, can 
they open themselves to new horizons and thus achieve genuine 
responsibility. 
The meaning of history is phenomenological, not logical. 
We enter the revolution through the gradual solicitation of our 
situation, and not through an all-encompassing willful act nor a 
predetermined material position. We begin with vague expecta­
tions, such as change or better living conditions. Most do not 
enter the revolution seeking to kill the king or following a step­
by-step blueprint for building utopia. We see ourselves in terms 
of our immediate concrete lived-experience, not as the represen­
tative of the world proletariat class. Yet as we become more 
involved, we begin to see the bigger picture. We learn the names 
and lives of others who share our misfortune. In this initial 
unreflective openness with others, the reciprocity of empathy 
presents itself. We ek-sist with others upon a common horizon of 
Being. 
The transformation into a revolutionary remains gradual, 
and is always dependent upon this openness to the horizons of 
Being. In absence of such opelmess, vanguard mentality is intro­
duced, and becomes a conservative force within the revolution­
ary bloc. In Phenomenologt} of Perception, Merleau-Ponty states 
"the revolutionary movement, like the world of the artist, is an 
intention which itself creates its instruments and its means of 
expression" (445}.The process of revolutionary modality is grad­
ual. Much like the artist, one begins with vague notions, and 
never a detailed formula. As we move along, we become further 
enticed and further engaged. We begin to see our own struggle 
within a larger movement, which is made possible through a 
common horizon of Being. As in the work of art, every stroke 
defines the whole, and the whole every stroke. 
Like the artist, it is important that we are open to the 
horizons of Being at every moment, which might take us in an 
unexpected direction. We must follow the feeling of inspiration, 
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and not subject free movement to the confines of rationality. 
Political activity, like aesthetics, must be defined for what it is: 
concrete lived-experience, not an exact science. Thus Merleau­
Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity, in its perpetual openness to 
Being, supports a radical and critical politics. Vanguard politics, 
on the contrary, dogmatically clings to history's eidos, and be­
comes reactive and conservative in its complacency. 
Counter to Westphal's notion of the invisible horizons of 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity, meaning is necessary 
and radical change is possible. Despite the inherent impossibility 
of exhausting the meaning of our horizons, such an act of recov­
ery is impossible not because of deception, but because of the 
thetic/non-thetic relationship. The thetic interweaves with the 
non-thetic to form an irreducible system of lived experience. 
History has a gestalt-seeking equilibrium, which embraces this 
relationship. If the vanguard distances its forms from the lived­
experience of the oppressed (with whom it forms a necessary 
system), the tension will erupt into revolution. One example is 
the American Civil Rights movement, which was the result of a 
long-standing forgetfulness by the White population in America. 
This "master/vanguard" group neglected the lived-experience of 
a large segment of American life. Thus this abstraction of forms 
charged the horizons of Black America, soliciting them to radical 
politics. 
Like all forms of expert behavior,4 revolutionary modality 
is more a matter of knowing-how than of knowing-that. My 
knowing-that revolution is a possibility is derived from my 
knowing-how the fields of oppression are presented through lived­
experience. The truth of the revolution can never be verified. Yet 
only once we break ourselves of foundationalism's quest for 
apodicticity, and instead view revolutionary involvement like the 
work of the artist, can we achieve the openness necessary for 
responsible revolutionary modality. Like judging aesthetic inter­
pretations, we can still judge interpretations of revolutionary 
situations as "better" or "worse." Some calls for revolution may 
be deemed "unripe" or "superficial." We are able to avoid the 
dilemma between complacency and nihilism, even without an 
absolute measuring stick of history. History's gestalt seeks a 
point of equilibrium that uses revolutionary politics to counter­
balance foundationalism's forgetfulness. 
Even if the proletariat or any other revolutionary group is 
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not ordained by the divine logic of history, nevertheless they are 
solicited by their embodied humanity. Revolution can minimize 
terrorism through openness to the horizons of Being. Such open­
ness allows for the perpetual movement of the dialectic and also 
for the dismissal of vanguard politics. The revolutionaries must 
keep an opelmess amongst themselves in order not to create a 
universal revolutionary category. Such a category would negate 
racial, ethnic, gender, and religious differences, and limit the 
movement of history. 
As has been demonstrated, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy 
of ambiguity warrants critical politics. Reciprocity of the flesh is 
made possible only once human relations are re-grounded from 
their abstract position allotted by traditional philosophy. 
Thereby, exclusive categories of the "irrational" (Le., women, 
non-Whites, non-Christians) are ended. Politics becomes a matter 
of shared situational perspective and openness to the horizons of 
Being, not a search for historical apodicticitlj. 
HamUne UniversihJ 
NOTES 
1 The ambiguity of situated-ness results from three interrelated factors. 
The subject does not constitute the object prior to perception (i.e., as an 
ego). The subject derives meaning from a pre-existing socio-natural 
world. And the subject lacks an 1=1 relationship to itself, because only 
as being-in-the-world does it relate to itself. 
2 I will concentrate on his philosophy of ambiguity as offered in his 
early works (1945-1947). These will include Phenomenology ofPercep­
tion, Sense and Nonsense, and Humanism and Terror. I believe the 
themes of ambiguity, made most explicit in his later writings, are 
implicit in the earlier writings and can be derived from them. The later 
works intensify his earlier project. Humanism and Terror comes closest 
to supporting vanguard politics when read apart from Merleau-Ponty's 
larger phenomenological project. 
3 Without the unconscious of Freud or the Will to Power of Nietzsche, 
Westphal argued that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity lacked 
a source of such repressive activity other than the vagueness of "Being." 
4 See Hubert Dreyfus. What Computers Still Can't Do: A Critique of 
Artificial Reason. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. 
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